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Via detailed personal interviews, this article canvasses the views 
of leading Singapore oppositional grassroots activists about the 
state of play in Singapore politics and likely developments over the 
next ten to fifteen years. We highlight two internet focused activists 
who have recently switched political parties. Although strong poll 
performers in 2011, the Workers’ Party of Singapore (WP) has lost 
three important members from its 2006 campaign – Chia Ti Lik, Goh 
Meng Seng, and James Gomez. In this paper, Goh and Gomez reflect 
upon their reasons for leaving WP. Goh points to the lack of emphasis 
placed by the WP upon internet activism which he views as a strategic 
error. In one key respect Gomez differs significantly in strategy from 
Goh. Gomez argues that Goh’s Malay Bureau within the National 
Solidarity Party (NSP) reflects outdated, old-school politics which 
can be contrasted sharply with Singapore Democratic Party’s (SDP) 
post-modern multicultural ethos. 
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Introduction
This paper provides a window into the lives and worldviews of two 
opposition grassroots activists in Prime Minister (PM) Lee Hsien Loong’s 
21st-century Singapore. In this paper, we pay particular attention to these 
politicians who are internet-oriented and who have switched political parties 
recently, namely Dr James Gomez and Mr Goh Meng Seng (hereafter GMS). 
The resurgent Workers’ Party of Singapore (新加坡工人党) (WP) was involved 
in both of these shifts with Gomez and GMS, along with Mr Chia Ti Lik, all 
having left the WP in quick succession. The three activists who left the WP 
after the 06 General Election, Chia (to Socialist Front), GMS (to the National 
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Solidarity Party (国民团结党) (NSP)), and Gomez (to the Singapore Democratic 
Party (新加坡民主党) (SDP)), are all relatively young, internet-oriented, and 
intellectually competent, and will not be easy for the WP to replace. They 
have all, even if at only the subconscious level, taken the steadying and 
professional WP influence into their respective new parties. Gomez comments 
that (personal interview, 10 January 2011, Melbourne): ‘[These] [t]hree people 
have left WP with political reputations and political capital’. GMS (personal 
interview, 15 October 2010, Singapore) has his own Facebook page where he 
has been active in the three years after he joined the NSP. The NSP’s relatively 
strong performance in the 7 May 2011 General Election (hereafter GE) may be 
partially due to GMS’s internet activism. Although GMS has taken a two-year 
sabbatical break from political work and has moved to Hong Kong, it is hoped 
his Party’s internet activism and the high public profile it earned during the 7 
May 2011 GE under GMS’s leadership can be maintained. Gilbert Goh (2011) 
provides a brief analysis of GMS’s June 2011 decision to take a sabbatical 
break. Ms Hazel Poa has taken over the NSP Secretary-Generalship. 
GMS and Gomez have been heavily involved in their respective 
parties’ recent strategic reorientations, with the SDP moving from a civil 
disobedience approach to an electoral approach and the NSP connecting more 
strongly with minority communities, younger voters, and women voters, and 
pursuing a deeper internet presence than previously. Gomez differs significantly 
in strategy from GMS in certain respects, arguing that the latter’s Malay 
Bureau within the NSP reflects outdated, old-school, ethnic politics which can 
be contrasted sharply with Gomez’ SDP’s sophisticated, multicultural ethos. 
Both the NSP and the SDP did well, in the authors’ opinion, at the 7 May 2011 
GE although neither party was able to win a parliamentary seat. GMS states 
that the NSP is aiming to form a coalition government with the ruling People’s 
Action Party (人民行动党) (PAP) in a ‘hung parliament’ at the end of the next 
fifteen years. 
The 2011 GE was the first in which candidates were permitted to campaign 
online through Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. PM Lee Hsien Loong held a 
one hour Facebook chat with internet users where he was inundated with 5,000 
comments (Tay, 2011, p. 2). In the battle of the attractive female candidates 
in Marine Parade GRC, 24-year-old advertising executive Ms Nicole Seah of 
the NSP was favourably received on Facebook while the PAP’s 27-year-old 
business consultant Ms Tin Pei Ling was unpopular on the new medium with 
even PAP supporters joining the ‘I do not want Tin Pei Ling in Parliament’ 
page. This page had 44,000 ‘likes’ as at 9 May 2011 (Chow, 2011). By contrast, 
Seah had 93,000 Facebook ‘likes’ as at 9 May 2011 making her the most 
popular Singaporean politician online (Tay, 2011). The PAP’s team leader in 
Marine Parade, the Senior Minister (SM) Goh Chok Tong, agreed that the Seah 
and Tin factors affected the final result in Marine Parade where the NSP lost 
by a smaller margin than had been generally expected (Chow, 2011). More 
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generally, younger voters discussed the election online among their friends 
through Facebook comments and Facebook ‘likes’ and ‘dislikes’ (Dr Mark 
Cenite of Nanyang Technological University, cited in Tay, 2011, p. 4). The 
PAP was increasingly seen as fighting obsolete battles with obsolete weapons 
(Daniel Yap, The Straits Times, 10 May 2011, p. A22). Internet activism among 
younger voters may well have been partly responsible for the victory by the 
WP in Aljunied GRC1 and the pro-PAP vote in contested constituencies falling 
to a historic low of 60.1%.
In this paper, we provide short case studies where the two primary 
interviewees reflect upon how and why they first became committed opposition 
supporters within the Singapore setting. This serves both to set the context and 
as interesting research information in its own right given that Singapore is 
a country where people since the mid-1970s, and the youth even more so, 
have not taken an active interest in politics (Hong and Huang, 2008, pp. 157-
62). The rest of this paper is divided, after a Research Methods section, into a 
James Gomez section and a GMS section with other interviewees’ comments 
scattered throughout these major sections as and when appropriate. We also 
report our interviewees’ opinions and perceptions as to where Singapore 
politics and its opposition parties will head in the next ten to fifteen years 
and what is needed to increase the opposition presence within the Singapore 
Parliament beyond the two elected MPs (as at the date of the interviews). The 
research is important in that it studies the opposition community as both, to 
use terms often but incorrectly attributed to Karl Marx, a ‘class-for-itself’ 
as well as a ‘class-in-itself’.2 Unlike other research which provide limited 
space to the opposition in works which are predominantly about the PAP, this 
research studies the opposition community as in-itself and for-itself. We begin 
to develop a history of the opposition which does not present it as unwanted, 
excluded other. Such an alternative history is important, especially in this era 
where the opposition is no longer supported by only the mavericks and the 
bitter but is able to attract 40% of the vote. 
As at the dates of our interviews, the combined opposition held two 
seats in Parliament, Potong Pasir SMC held by Mr Chiam See Tong of the 
Singapore People’s Party (新加坡人民党) (SPP) and Hougang SMC held by 
1 A Group Representative Constituency (GRC) is a large electoral area where teams 
of four, five or six opposition candidates compete against the same number of PAP candidates. 
The GRC system, introduced in 1988, was ostensibly designed to allow for minority ethnic 
group representation in Parliament as each GRC team had to comprise at least one member of 
Singapore’s ethnic minority communities. The remaining electorates are smaller SMCs (or Single 
Member Constituencies).
2 Although Marx did not use the actual terms ‘class-in-itself’ and ‘class-for-itself’, his 
ideas contain the concepts. As Slaughter (1975, Chapter VII, online version) writes: “Working-
class consciousness is then, for Marxists, the comprehending in struggle of the process through 
which the proletariat develops from its identity as formed by capitalism (the mass of exploited 
wage-labourers, the class ‘in itself’) to the working class organised as a revolutionary force for the 
taking of power and the building of socialism (the class ‘for itself’)”. 
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Mr Low Thia Khiang (hereafter LTK) of the WP. The 2011 GE saw LTK 
strategically shift ground to Aljunied GRC where his five-person team was the 
first opposition team in Singaporean history to ever win a GRC (Kor and Ong, 
2011). LTK’s designated successor, Mr Yaw Shin Leong, recaptured Hougang 
SMC for the WP, with a two percentage-point swing in his party’s favour (Kor 
and Chong, 2011). Mr Chiam contested for the SPP in Bishan-Toa Payoh 
GRC while his wife, Madam Lina Low, contested in Potong Pasir SMC. Both 
Chiams were unsuccessful in their respective contests with Potong Pasir SMC 
being returned to the PAP Government by a mere 114 votes (Au Young and 
Durai, 2011; Hussain, 2011).3 The second- and fourth-mentioned authors of 
this paper are Singaporean citizens and registered voters in Potong Pasir SMC. 
Research method and research questions
The research questions posed to our study’s interviewees are as 
follows:
1. Explain the events in your life that prompted you to become an 
opposition supporter? 
2. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of SDP (or the 
opposition party you are most closely involved with)?
3.  What do you think will happen to Singapore politics in the next 10-
15 years and how many seats will the opposition win at in the next 
election?
4.  What do you think of SDP Youth and internet political activism?
5.  What do the opposition parties need to do to go from 25% to 50.1% 
and what type of people make up that the next 25% that the opposition 
must win over?
The data sources for the present study are: literature search; participant-
observation; and semi-structured interviews with opposition politicians 
and grassroots activists (with fifteen interviewees in person, two of those 
interviewed twice, and six additional interview responses sent and returned 
by e-mail). Participant-observation includes the first-mentioned (Australian) 
author’s attendance at the SDP’s 30th Anniversary Dinner held on 27 February 
2010 and the 31st Anniversary Dinner held on 19 February 2011. This author 
also attended the election night count and press conference with SDP politicians 
and supporters held at the Quality Hotel in Balestier Road, Singapore, on the 
night of 7-8 May 2011.   
3  All voting results for the 7 May 2011 GE are taken from The Sunday Times [Singapore], 
8 May 2011, noon edition, pp. H9-H12. Results for 2006 and earlier years are taken from www.
singapore-elections.com/
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Interview with James Gomez (SDP politician and activist, formerly with 
the WP)    
Gomez has been involved in opposition activism for over a decade 
primarily through the South-East Asian NGOs and Think Centres. Ten years 
ago, he published Self-Censorship: Singapore’s Shame (Gomez, 2000) and 
went on a speaking tour of Australia and New Zealand in support of the book. 
He famously contested for the WP in the 2006 GE in Aljunied GRC where his 
strong team put up a credible losing performance which saw Sylvia Lim enter 
Parliament as Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP). Although 
the 2006 GE minority race certificate issue (http://www.singapore-elections.
com/parl-2006-ge/) and the resultant government smear campaign against 
him, is probably what Gomez is best known for in the eyes of most members 
of the public, for those more actively involved in politics he is known as 
one of the opposition’s strongest intellectuals who has stood out through his 
media studies research background. Gomez has now resigned from his faculty 
position at Monash University with plans to set up a new Think Centre NGO 
in Singapore. 
Gomez argues that the main problem inhibiting the development 
of a deeper and richer civil society is not restrictive laws but people’s self-
censorship, a good example of Michel Foucault’s (1977, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 
1981) idea of the goal of the modern state being for people to discipline 
themselves. George (2008, p. 272) refers, in very Foucauldian fashion 
(Stivens, 2007, p. 39), to ‘behind-the-scenes self-censorship’ in relation to the 
behaviours of editors and journalists working for the Singaporean mainstream 
media (hereafter MSM). Similarly, in relation to the Singaporean women’s 
group Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE), Lyons 
(2008) writes that: ‘The state’s heavy hand in matters of civil society meant 
that AWARE constantly monitored its own behaviour for fear of attracting the 
state’s wrath’. It is not for no reason that Gomez’s book was entitled Self-
Censorship: Singapore’s Shame. Gomez explains his thinking on this point as 
follows:
“The issue was not about [laws restricting people from] doing anything 
political. There is a lot of room to do things political. There is self-
censorship, people are afraid, people do not collaborate or participate. 
The minions over-administer the legal provisions, they err on the side 
of caution, [there is] over-constraint. It has continued to be the same 
since my NUS [National University of Singapore] days”.
Similarly, at our first meeting at the SDP headquarters on 22 September 2009, 
the SDP’s Assistant Secretary-General John Tan explained the concept of 
invisible but heavily-policed ‘out-of-bounds’ markers within Singaporean 
society which represent an additional ‘surplus-repression’ in Freudian terms 
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(Freud, 1960, 1962; Marcuse, 1966). They constitute a stronger and more 
aggressive super-ego voice prohibiting actions and behaviours that would seem 
harmless and benign in many other countries. To cite Freud (1962, pp. 48-9): 
“Although it [the super-ego] is accessible to all later influences, it 
nevertheless preserves throughout life the character given to it by its 
derivation from the father-complex – namely, the capacity to stand 
apart from the ego and to master it. It is a memorial of the former 
weakness and dependence of the ego, and the mature ego remains 
subject to its domination. As the child was once under a compulsion 
to obey its parents, so the ego submits to the categorical imperative 
of its super-ego”.4
The term ‘out-of-bounds-markers’ (Barr, 2008, p. 229; Lyons, 2008, p. 256) 
was first used by the then PM Goh Chok Tong in late 1994 in his written 
response to an earlier Straits Times commentary by the novelist Catherine Lim 
(Lyons, 2008, p. 256). However, Goh ‘merely provided a common language 
with which to name an already internalised mode of behaviour’ (Lyons, 2008, 
p. 260). John Tan states that Singaporeans pass on the boundary markers 
to their children by actions and example rather than by words in the same 
way that other behavioural constraints are passed on to children that do not 
relate specifically to the Singaporean context. George (2008, p. 276) may not 
be correct, at least in relation to PAP supporters and the apolitical, when he 
states that: ‘[T]he dominant ideology ... has not reached the ultimate status of 
internalised common sense’. The SDP’s Jarrod Luo comments further: 
“As I grew up I realized the social culture pervades through all 
levels of society. People dare not ask questions, people in authority 
cannot be questioned. I can’t bring myself to be assimilated into this 
culture if you will. It’s a very fundamental feeling. ... I witnessed how 
they [the Establishment] socially engineered the populace through 
various policies, incentives, disincentives; we are being treated like 
lab rats – press red button you get shock, press green button you get 
ten days of food. ... Now that I have finished my study I want to be 
full contributing adult in my society. They just want us to remain 
economic digits. It’s an absolute violation of my personal space and 
my life decisions are made without consulting me” [group interview, 
14 October 2010, Singapore].
From 2001-06 Gomez remained an ordinary member of the WP which was 
beginning to attract the attention of a large swathe of voters who were dissatisfied 
4 Citing Freud is something of an in-joke as John Tan previously worked as a psychology 
lecturer at the Singapore campus of James Cook University.
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with the PAP but who still preferred a relatively safe and conservative political 
machine. During this era, the WP’s focus on electoral politics could be 
contrasted with the SDP’s emphasis on civil disobedience. In the 2006 GE, 
Gomez contested as part of the WP’s team in Aljunied GRC and there was a 
negative media campaign by the Government in relation to the issue of Gomez’s 
minority race certificate. He argues that the negative campaign backfired (the 
WP performed well in Aljunied) because voters wanted to debate real issues 
and were disappointed when the campaign degenerated into old-style, personal 
attacks (which had worked well for the PAP even as recently as the 97 GE and 
the Tang Liang Hong affair).5 
Gomez then talks about his strategy in the immediate aftermath of 
the 2006 GE and this has not been given sufficient attention in other published 
sources. He decided to withdraw from public view during the years from 06 to 
08 ‘so as not to confuse the electorate in the interim’ (personal interview, 10 
January 2011, Caulfield campus, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia). 
He then decided to focus on his career development. He completed his PhD in 
08 and then went to Japan for postdoc after completing his job in Sweden. In 
May 09, he accepted the faculty position at Monash in Melbourne. As Gomez 
explains: ‘Between 06 and 08, there was little mention of James Gomez in 
the [Singaporean] media, not even on the internet. I withdrew from writing. 
I didn’t want to cloud it [his public image]. The first time I came into the 
news was three years later’. In December 08, he graduated with his PhD from 
Monash and this attracted significant attention from the media as Singapore is 
a country where academic qualifications bestow enormous prestige. As Gomez 
elaborates:
“Boom, suddenly I was back in the news with PhD and postdoc. It was 
a strategic comeback as I knew negative campaigning would make a 
comeback. MSM would always refer back to the thing that put you in 
the news last time. I know it would take some work to flush this out of 
the system [personal interview, 10 January 2011]”. 
Gomez shows the shrewdness of his strategic political thinking here and it 
is clear that his academic training in brand recognition informs his practical 
decisions to great effect and vice versa. He kept out of the limelight for three 
years and when he returned he had a significant positive factor next to his 
name in terms of his PhD qualification. This made it more difficult for the 
MSM to bring the minority race certificate issue back into the centre of their 
focus. If they did so, then the people would perceive that the MSM was living 
in the past. Gomez also shows awareness of something referred to by the NSP 
contestant in Hong Kah GRC at the 97 GE, Dr Wong Wee Nam, who told the 
researcher (personal interview, 1 March 2010, Singapore) that the opposition 
5  For more on the Tang Liang Hong affair see Seow (2006).
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has always had to deal with the spectre as well as the continuing reality of 
the Government and the MSM making disparaging remarks about the ‘lack 
of quality’ of opposition candidates with quality understood to refer largely 
to academic qualifications and professional status. The practical benefits of 
Gomez’s education are that they better allow him to make informed expert 
comments on Singaporean society and his increased ability to now function as 
a research mentor to younger scholars/ activists who would later include the 
present paper’s second- and fourth-mentioned authors. 
Gomez next discusses the reasons for his unexpected switch from 
the WP to the SDP in 2010. Although, in terms of Melbourne football it might 
be seen as the equivalent of moving from Carlton to Collingwood (!), given 
Gomez’s own focus on personal branding the move might not be as significant 
to him as it has been to some outside observers such as the anonymous, 
Singapore-based, online commentator Bryan Ti (not his real name). Gomez 
places more emphasis on his (polite and respectful) manner of leaving the WP 
rather than his actual reasons for leaving. In Gomez’s words:
“I felt leaving WP at the appropriate moment was important. I 
understand Singapore is a small place; you have to work with all these 
people for the next 20 years. I looked after their interests too, any exit 
should be smooth. After three years it was good timing. In January 
2010 I let my [WP] membership lapse. I knew when I made the 
announcement it would be news. For nine months prior we had [the 
NGO] SFD [Singaporeans for Democracy] in the works. I showed in 
2010 I am out of WP. The public knew they had not heard much of 
me for three years. The public has formed its own opinion that based 
on my temperament and type of politics WP was not suitable for me. 
I always take my bearing from the ground [because] this points to 
[where you will receive] your support in terms of resources, time, 
and money. The ground supported me to leave WP. ... I left delicately 
and sophisticatedly. I gave a warning a week before to key members 
of the WP”.
Gomez implies here that his incompatibility with the WP was a further reason 
for his low public profile from 06 to 08. Gomez may have perceived that the 
social justice focus of the SDP is more in line with his own vision and the 
same can be said for the high priority the SDP gives to its internet footprint. 
The SDP’s Ms Chee Siok Chin comments on her own personal social-justice 
focus as follows: 
“I don’t for one minute regret having left mainstream work, to 
advocate for justice. I’m seeking social justice and accountability. 
It’s the most empowering thing in my life to stand up and get the 
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Government to respond even if it is in the most harsh and draconian 
manner” [group interview, 14 October 2010, Singapore].
Gomez indicates that he was proactively sought out and pursued by the SDP 
‘informally for a year’. He undertook a few activities with the party and found 
‘similar synergies’. Gomez discusses the issue of rebranding of the SDP, a 
shift in party emphasis which has taken place over the last year or two which 
clearly suggests a strategic move away from the civil disobedience approach to 
a more elections-focused approach. Gomez is probably at the centre of all such 
rebranding initiatives. He comments as follows on the important topic of SDP 
rebranding which many commentators perceive is vital for the SDP if it is to 
improve its performance in future elections. These commentators point out that 
many conservative Singaporeans cannot adjust to the concept of wilful law-
breaking regardless of how important the underlying point might be. Gomez 
comments on the SDP rebranding issue as follows (emphasis added): 
“Rebranding can take many forms. The most extreme form is changing 
the leader. You can change name, colour, [and/or] approach. This 
requires acceptance of stakeholders of the Party. SDP have decided 
to take a change in approach. The thrust of the change is from civil 
disobedience to the electoral approach. There is a momentum that has 
come through. People sense this change. The challenge now is to take 
this rebranding to the ground. Successful management of electoral 
communications is evidence of rebranding. The SDP’s approach is 
contemporary, reflecting globalization, multiculturalism, etc. That’s 
the brand, it’s contemporary, it looks new, and it’s refreshing. This is 
informed by the type of people you have. The frontlines give you a 
sense of internationalism, being contemporary, etc.”
Gomez’s description of the SDP brand, based on the ethos of the grassroots 
campaigners, seems to the authors to be fair and accurate. While older party 
members and supporters, such as John Tan, Dr Wong Wee Nam, Dr Chee 
Soon Juan, and Chee Siok Chin, base their worldview on traditional, small-l 
liberalism, younger advocates in their 20s and 30s tend to adopt a more post-
modern, international, and multicultural approach (which can be characterized, 
in shorthand form, as being more ‘Chomsky’ than either ‘Trotsky’ or ‘Tolstoy’). 
These younger internet activists, such as Chong Kai Xiong, Jaslyn Go, Jarrod 
Luo, Seelan Palay, Mhd Khalis Rifhan, Martyn See, and Rachel Zeng, tend to 
view Singapore as just a spot on the globe which should operate in line with 
international viewpoints on democracy and human rights and developments in 
the region and beyond. These activists are wary of flag-waving patriotism as 
it does not accord with their internationalist outlook and they are aware that 
‘founding fathers’ patriotism has been an important source of PAP power and 
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ideology. It could be said that Gomez and Wijeysingha are the new public faces 
and rallying points for this younger group of SDP internet activists.  
It should be pointed out that the rebranding, associated with Gomez 
and involving other ‘moderates’ Ang Yong Guan, Michelle Lee, and Tan Jee 
Say, is best viewed as what the Marxists used to term, a change in ‘tactics’, as 
opposed to a more fundamental change in philosophy or beliefs at least as far 
as the extant party leadership is concerned. For example, Mao Zedong called 
for a united front with the KMT nationalists in the 1937 war against Japan, 
claiming that the distinction between the Chinese and the Japanese imperialists 
was now the ‘principal contradiction’ (Mao, 1971, p. 110), but the underlying 
philosophy of the Chinese Communist Party remained the same. Similarly, 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) members and sympathizers formed a united 
front with the PAP in the late-1950s. The following quote from John Tan 
(from October 2010 rather than 2009 or previous years) indicates the SDP’s 
leadership’s philosophy: ‘It was when I studied about non-violent action that I 
thought that’s the answer to our problem. The answer lies in non-violent action, 
civil pressure, I’m avoiding the words ‘civil disobedience’ as it resonates very 
negatively in our society’ (group interview, 14 October 2010). 
The SDP has begun to highlight more educated professionals with a 
somewhat moderate perspective such as Party Assistant Treasurer Dr Vincent 
Wijeysingha, and the 35-year-old, school-teacher Ms Michelle Lee who both 
contested in Holland-Bukit Timah GRC. In addition to Gomez and these two 
new candidates, the 27 August 2011 presidential election candidate, Mr Tan 
Jee Say, was also an important recruiting coup for the SDP in the run-up to 
the 2011 GE. A former principal private-secretary for Goh Chok Tong during 
Goh’s Deputy Prime Ministership (1985-90), Mr Tan has significant cultural 
and political capital within Singaporean society. He contested alongside Ang, 
Lee, and Wijeysingha in Holland-Bukit Timah GRC (all four of whom were 
fresh candidates for the SDP) where the SDP team received a creditable 39.90% 
of valid votes (32,322 votes out of 81,004). All of these candidates, including 
Gomez as well who contested in Sembawang GRC, were generally perceived in 
the broader community as ‘respectable’ rather than ‘mavericks’ and none were 
tainted by involvement in the party during the civil disobedience era. Gomez is 
correct to point out that the party previously found the PAP’s relentless negative 
campaigning as extremely unsettling and they were forced into reactive mode 
for many years. This has created some quite understandable negativity and 
cynicism, even ‘hostility’, on the part of the ‘Old Guard’ leadership, including 
the Chees and John Tan, towards the MSM. For this reason, it is important 
that the party, whilst retaining Chee as its leader, gives significant media and 
public exposure to its new candidates and especially to Gomez, Tan Jee Say, 
and Wijeysingha. It was Wijeysingha who was the SDP’s representative on the 
Channel News Asia programme A Political Forum on Singapore’s Future (2 
April 2011) (MediaCorp, 2011). 
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Gomez and the researcher then moved on to discuss of Research 
Question 3, ‘What do the opposition parties need to do to go from 25% to 
50.1% and what type of people make up that next 25% that the opposition must 
win over?’ Gomez hits out at GMS’s initiative of a Malay Bureau within the 
NSP which was designed by GMS to be a nodal point within the Party which 
will encourage of Malay party members to network among themselves, and to 
recruit Malay candidates. The Bureau clearly also indicates GMS’s boldness 
in recruiting Malay candidates within the context of an overall strategic goal 
of taking on PAP teams in GRCs. One minority race candidate is required 
to be a part of each contesting team. The NSP has been viewed, until very 
recently, as being essentially a ‘Chinese party’ and so the recruitment of non-
Chinese candidates to contest under its banner has not always been easy for 
the party. Gomez regards the implicit ideology of the Malay Bureau as being 
wrong-headed and part of an old-school, sectarian politics which the PAP 
has historically shown itself to be adept at. By contrast, the ‘new’ politics of 
the rebranded SDP does not highlight racial or ethnic difference, even in the 
positive sense; it is instead sophisticated, globalized, multicultural, and post-
modern. Although Gomez might be willing to acknowledge some potential 
practical benefits of a Malay Bureau (our conversation did not head down 
this path), clearly the implicit ideology behind it, although well meaning, is 
anathema to him. Similarly, younger SDP activists such as Jarrod Luo, and 
Rachel Zeng have campaigned consistently online for ‘race’ to be removed as 
an identification marker on Singaporean identity cards (opposed, interestingly 
enough, by the more socially conservative 23-year-old Alex Tan, who stood for 
the Reform Party in Ang Mo Kio GRC in the 2011 GE and, before that, was 
with the SPP Youth Wing). Gomez comment on the NSP’s Malay Bureau is 
that it is not in sync with a contemporary approach to politics.
In terms of Gomez’s predictions about the 2011 GE, he predicted 
a 1-15 percentage-point overall decline in the pro-PAP vote. The actual 
percentage-point swing against the PAP in contested constituencies was 
6.46%-points (2011 vote 60.14%, 2006 vote 66.60%). He continued: ‘If we 
look at a 6% swing, and based on last elections, only Aljunied [GRC] will go 
in’. This is exactly what happened. He also commented that ‘Potong Pasir is 
fifty-fifty’, an accurate comment given that the SPP eventually lost Potong 
Pasir SMC by the miniscule margin of 114 votes. 
Mr Goh Meng Seng (former Secretary-General, National Solidarity Party 
(NSP), 2007-11)
GMS was an élite scholar, having passed through the Social Sciences 
at the National University of Singapore (NUS) around the time when his 
fellow-traveller Gomez was also on the Kent Ridge campus. GMS’s NUS 
undergraduate degree was in economics, which included an honours year. Like 
Gomez, his father was not inclined towards the Establishment, being somewhat 
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influenced by the socialist ideas of the 1960s (personal interview with first-
mentioned researcher, 15 October 2010, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore). 
GMS goes on to indicate that a main topic of interest in his university days was 
the SDP rallies held in the lead up to the 91 GE. His first political rally was 
SDP at Potong Pasir in the 91 GE campaign. GMS says: ‘I did some reports 
on rallies, I was involved in citizen reporting, NUS electronic bulletin boards, 
that was my first political activism. There was this bulletin news group which 
evolved into Social Culture Singapore’. This quote is significant as it shows 
that GMS’s online activism dates back to 1991. 
GMS explains further his decision to join the WP in 01: ‘So through 
a mutual friend I was introduced to LTK. After a talk, I joined WP and never 
looked back. I stood in 06 in Aljunied [GRC]. I was given the task to be 
Mandarin anchor in 06.’ With GMS’s story now jumping over to 06, we see, 
remarkably, that his political life again parallels that of Gomez with both men 
being part of the 06 GE WP team to contest in Aljunied GRC. The other team 
members were: Sylvia Lim Swee Lian (aged 40); Tan Wui Hua (39); and Mohd 
Rahizan bin Yaacob (49). At this time, Gomez was aged 40 and GMS was only 
36. Of this team, only Yaacob was not a first-time candidate, and only Yaacob 
was over 41 years old. This team, known as the ‘A-team’, versus the ‘Suicide 
Squad’ which took on PM Lee Hsien Loong’s team in Ang Mo Kio GRC and 
Eric Tan’s ‘B-team’ in East Coast GRC, reflects the resurgence of the WP 
under LTK with its special emphasis upon youthful, motivated, professional-
type candidates. GMS comments as follows about the campaign for Aljunied 
GRC in the 06 GE: 
“Most of the speeches [by me] were in Mandarin except for one 
defending James Gomez. We had a fight in Aljunied GRC; James 
became the lightning rod. People called him a liar, cheater, and a 
scheming fellow but I know the whole story. It was a mistake he 
made; he had not planned for it. I rebutted George Yeo [PAP team 
leader]. I said I will not drop James Gomez. We had quite a strong 
performance [43.91% or 58,593 votes out of 133,436 valid votes]”.
The Marxist-Leninist philosopher Mao Zedong (1971, p. 128) once remarked 
that, dialectically speaking, everything morphs into its opposite. This happened 
with the WP in the immediate aftermath of the 06 GE as three of its youngest 
and most talented political candidates, Chia, GMS, and Gomez, jumped ship 
as a result of festering disagreements with the party leadership which could 
not be satisfactorily resolved. GMS argues that the WP was not able to manage 
effectively the massive influx of members which came into the party as a result 
of its very successful 06 GE campaign and so passion and enthusiasm appeared 
to morph dialectically into rigidity and frustration. GMS points to a tightening 
of party policy regarding media engagement which he implies was a result of 
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a nervous party leadership trying to assert its control over the operations of 
activists. The party did not want its CEC members to expose their identities 
on the internet. GMS argues that the ‘new media is quite instantaneous and 
interactive’ and ‘if you [the Party leadership] say you can have no blunders on 
new media it will not allow people to grow’. GMS points out that, while for 
LTK and his generation the internet is very much ‘new media’, it is not that 
way for GMS himself as he has been an online political activist, like Gomez, 
since 1991. Clearly cultural and inter-generational tension had begun to emerge 
within the WP in the aftermath of the 06 GE. GMS says that the Party was ‘not 
very responsive’ to his pushing of increased online campaigning and activism, 
but adds: ‘It’s understandable because we [the Party] put so much effort in 
rebranding the whole party. We need to be careful of slurs to party branding 
if people did things wrong on the net’. The extreme caution and conservatism 
of the WP leadership in the LTK era has generally won it praise from most 
sections of the electorate and the party has progressively become immune and 
resistant to all Government campaigns against it, campaigns which used to 
have other opposition groups in panic and reactive mode, including the earlier 
incarnation of the WP under JBJ. The negative side, or as Mao (1971) would 
say the dialectical opposite, of this WP cool image has been its conservatism 
towards online campaigning and its extreme concern not to be seen as moving 
ahead of the electorate in any respect at all. At a WP party conference of 
ordinary members, GMS asked the audience for a show of hands as to who had 
come to know the party through the internet. GMS comments: ‘75% to 80% 
put up their hands, I made my point’. As a result of a lack of party support for 
online campaigning, GMS resigned from the WP. GMS is willing to say a lot 
more than Gomez about why he left WP and one wonders whether the reasons 
and reasoning offered by GMS also apply for Gomez. GMS explains: 
“Official reason [for my resignation] is I took responsibility for the 
bad press, slur on the party brand. I felt if I was to stay in the party 
it would be too restrictive for my personal growth. For those [still] 
inside it [this approach] will do them no good in the long run. It’s 
just like a child. If you don’t want him to fall you prevent him from 
walking. It’s not logical. I felt aspiring politicians will not have a 
good training ground if they stay in the party”.
Chia Ti Lik comments as follows about why he left the WP: ‘I left WP 
because of their controls on expression on the internet’ (personal Facebook 
communication with the first-mentioned researcher, 15 December 2010). This 
is, of course, the same reason given by GMS. 
GMS moves on now to discuss his NSP period which began in 2007. 
His dilemma on leaving the WP was whether to ‘start a new party or join an 
existing one’. He was approached to join the NSP by the NSP’s President Mr 
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Sebastian Teo. GMS says: 
“He [Teo]’s more active in media engagement [compared to WP]. He 
showed me the vision; he wanted to revamp the party, to become a 
key player in the opposition field. He asked me to join. I thought ‘why 
not?’ The NSP already has an infrastructure; I should see how I could 
contribute to building”. 
It is little wonder that Teo had a vision to revamp the NSP around this time, 
probably sensing a renewed community interest in the opposition and having 
observed the WP’s then very rapid and successful rebirth. However, GMS 
experienced a ‘cultural shock’ when he joined the NSP as they had nowhere 
near the level of support and community recognition as his former party. GMS 
also acknowledges that LTK was a ‘very good mentor’ and the three ex-WP 
people mentioned in this paper no doubt grew, developed, and stabilized as 
politicians and as people during their time under LTK although ultimately 
all three decided to part company with the WP. GMS says about LTK: ‘He 
cautions us about such circumstances [being provoked or put under stress], you 
must be cool and calm in your analysis, and you must avoid being flattered’.
In the end, GMS was offered the NSP Secretary-Generalship although 
he fails to mention exactly how this came about. GMS makes the direct and 
somewhat unexpected comment that ‘[t]here are no core values’ at the NSP, 
i.e. at the time he joined. He adds, speaking in the present tense as he was still 
Secretary-General at the date of our interview, 15 October 2010: ‘My job after 
taking over is to reconstruct branding for NSP’. He points out, very accurately, 
that the NSP has been a party with much potential, it has had its successes 
(most notably a strong showing in Hong Kah GRC under Dr Wong Wee Nam 
in the 97 GE, and Steve Chia serving as NCMP from 01-06), but it has failed to 
capitalize on periods of public interest, and few voters in 07 really understood 
exactly what the Party stood for.   
Clearly Teo was giving GMS a huge challenge and, looking back and 
despite hostility and doubt from his many critics, the present authors argue that 
GMS performed well and secured a rejuvenation of the party (if not actually a 
rebranding) during the three years of his Secretary-Generalship. He unearthed 
and attracted strong talent including Tony Tan Lay Thiam (not to be confused 
with the PAP’s Tony Tan Keng Yam), Hazel Poa, and the youthful and popular 
Seah. Regarding the May 2011 GE, it can always be argued, with the benefit 
of hindsight, that GMS put the wrong teams into the wrong constituencies, and 
never clearly defined the party policies. However, contrary to such assertions, 
GMS chose to focus policy on housing issues. He moved the party into a more 
humanitarian direction (and thus closer to the SDP), and he backed up his 
special emphasis upon housing and HDB issues by taking head on the then 
Minister for National Development, Mr Mah Bow Tan, in Tampines GRC. 
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The fact that Mah no longer serves in this position is one measure of GMS’s 
achievement as well as the fact that the 11.29%-point swing against Mah’s 
team in Tampines GRC nearly doubled the national percentage swing of 
6.46%-points against the PAP. As Chan (2011) points out, Mah’s team scored 
57.21%, three percentage-points below the PAP’s national average. Chan 
(2011) comments: ‘By his own standard, it is a blow’ as Mah had previously 
said, in a Straits Times interview, that he had hoped to score above the national 
average. Perhaps the NSP’s best team should have been put into Tampines 
GRC, including two or three of the party’s strongest Chinese candidates Steve 
Chia, Hazel Poa, Nicole Seah, and/or Tony Tan. 
One of GMS’s major initiatives, at least according to his own 
interpretation of events, is the NSP’s setting up of its Malay Bureau. GMS 
explains his reasoning here behind this controversial decision, one opposed by 
both Gomez and Patrick Lee:
“I wanted to start up one in WP. PAP says ‘no racial politics’ but they 
play the race card all the time. They want to portray themselves as 
the only political party who can take care of all the races. They guard 
this jealously. They will attack people as Chinese [Tang Liang Hong, 
97] or Malay chauvinist [Jufrie Mahmood, Eunos GRC, 91]. They 
refuse to acknowledge that other parties can be guardians of other 
races. This is something I have to address if I want the party to be a 
serious contender for the future. To me, I’m not playing the race card. 
I’m a Mandarin anchor. But my party must take care of Malays and 
Indians. We are multiracial. ... I’ve a multiracial outlook, challenging 
bases of PAP”.
Interestingly, GMS sees the Malay Bureau as a strategy to claim some of 
the ground from the PAP in relation to being seen as thought-leaders of the 
all-inclusive, multiracial approach. He sees it as multiracialism and forward-
looking whereas Gomez sees it as a part of old-school, ethnic politics not 
suitable for the post-globalization era. Clearly it is all a matter of interpretation. 
The Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA)’s Patrick Lee Song Juan worries 
that GMS has opened himself up for a smear campaign by essentially taking on 
the PAP in one of its traditional areas of strength and hegemony and (Patrick) 
Lee has labelled the Malays attracted to the Malay Bureau as ‘Malay trash’ 
or second-rate candidates (Patrick Lee, personal interview, 12 October 2010, 
Singapore). As far back as the 1950s and 1960s, both Malay and Chinese-
educated PAP politicians, such as Ahmad Ibrahim, Othman Wok, Yaacob 
Mohamed, Rahim Ishak, Ong Pang Boon, Lee Khoon Choy, Jek Yeun Thong, 
were stressing the multiracialism of the PAP (Ibrahim, 1999; Sai and Huang, 
1999). This was in the context of the creation of a Malaysian Malaya (Kwok, 
1999, p. 56; Sai and Huang, 1999, p. 150) (versus the United Malays National 
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Organisation or UMNO’s concept of a Malay Malaya (Sai and Huang, 1999, p. 
150)). However, the discourse changed, in the 1970s and 1980s, to the CMIO 
(Chinese, Malay, Indian, Other) model (Sai and Huang, 1999, p. 160-1) which 
reverts back to an emphasis on the preservation of the three or four traditional 
cultures (Sai and Huang, 1999, p. 155) in the face of the importation of 
decadent, Western cultural values which are a by-product of industrialization 
(Doshi and Coclanis, 1999, p. 39; Sai and Huang, 1999, pp. 153, 155; Stivens, 
2007, p. 38). The PAP plays the race-card by defining and re-defining the 
boundary-markers of what are and what are not acceptable references to 
culture and ethnicity in the public realm (Sai and Huang, 1999, pp. 136, 146, 
154). One important assumption of the PAP is that cultural discussions are only 
acceptable if thoroughly depoliticized (Sai and Huang, 1999, pp. 154, 157), 
and this is the reason why Patrick Lee might be concerned about the Malay 
Bureau opening the NSP up to allegations. However, as a Mandarin anchor 
promoting Malay and Indian causes, GMS has neatly sidestepped any potential 
allegations because he is not promoting the language and cultural aspirations 
of his own race ahead of the similar aspirations of other races. Whilst the word 
‘guardians’ in the above GMS quote might seem to some condescending, GMS 
clearly has no intentions in this regard and is well meaning. He is working 
from the position of the NSP traditionally being perceived as a ‘Chinese 
Party’ and the Malay and Indian Bureaus have to be seen against this unique 
backdrop. GMS sets out some recent political history, noting that the PAP has 
always been concerned with how it is perceived by each ethnic community 
and how it will work strategically and proactively to repair what is perceived 
as a temporarily weakened relationship with any particular ethnic group. For 
example, after the ‘Marxist conspiracy’ case6 of 1987-88, the PAP put in major 
efforts to win back the Roman Catholic vote with George Yeo being used as the 
PAP’s main Catholic ambassador to the Catholics. After the PAP’s campaign 
against Jufrie Mahmood, the pro-PAP Malay vote suffered adversely. (GMS 
argues that LTK’s win in Hougang SMC in 91 was probably assisted by a 
Malay swing towards him as a ‘spillover effect’ from neighbouring Eunos 
GRC.) Because of this, the PAP made a major strategic effort to strengthen its 
Malay support through various policies such as the establishment of the Malay/ 
Muslim community self-help group Mendaki. This led to a swing towards the 
PAP by Malay voters in 97 and 01 before being counterbalanced by a slight 
swing back to the opposition in 06. 
GMS argues that ‘Malays are more impacted by group leadership’ 
than the Chinese, for example, through informal and unregulated Muslim ‘cell 
groups’, and so the Malay community vote swings faster and more strongly 
than does the Chinese vote. He speaks as follows about the NSP’s Malay 
Bureau, now moving on from the contestable logic and ideology behind it to 
how it has developed in practical terms:
6 Barr (2008) and Seow (1994) provide introductions to the ‘Marxist conspiracy’ case. 
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“I have to correct this [PAP supporters putting pressure on Malays not 
to contest for the opposition]. I will invite people in the community. 
My Malay network has established community connections. The 
number of Malay activists we have is still growing, ten to twenty 
[at date of interview, 15 October 2010]. Some are committed to 
stand for election, I have a political science graduate working for 
an MNC who will stand, and one lady active in social community 
work. They will compile issues pertaining to the community and they 
will attract professionals from the Malay community to join [NSP]. 
Patrick is totally mistaken about ‘Malay trash’. [Coincidentally 
Patrick telephoned GMS in the middle of our lunchtime interview in 
a Malaysian restaurant in Ang Mo Kio Town Centre.]”
In addressing Research Question 5, ‘What do the opposition parties need to 
do to go from 25% to 50.1% and what type of people makes up that next 25% 
that the opposition must win over?’ GMS makes additional comments about 
the Malay Bureau which fits into his (then) long-term strategic goal of, within 
fifteen years, forming a coalition government with the PAP within a ‘hung 
parliament’. 
Conclusion
When WP supporters cheered the victory in Aljunied GRC in May 
2011 they were not only cheering a present victory but a ‘retroactive redemption 
of the past’ (Žižek, 2008, pp. 81-2) whereby the present victory is seen as 
giving power and credence to certain people’s past efforts (dating back to the 
1950s) as well as the interpretations of those efforts ‘Aljunied’ was a symbol 
of the wishes of non-PAP supporters that their memories, perceptions, and 
experiences be given equal respect and reverence within the national discourse 
of self-imaging. Interestingly, George Yeo lost his seat through the Aljunied 
victory and Yeo has been the PAP’s chief ideologue in recent times (Hong and 
Huang, 2008, p. 191). The rejuvenation of the NSP and the rebranding of the 
SDP must also be seen in this light. For non-PAP supporters, the rejuvenated 
opposition provides them a new and more palatable way of viewing themselves 
and the world, as well as possible paths through it, past, present, and future. 
If the spectre of Lim Chin Siong lives on today it is in Hougang and Aljunied.
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